Concepts of normality shape our understanding of the world as well as the way we see ourselves. What counts as normal is by no means simply a “matter of fact” nor is, in contrast, what appears abnormal, deviant or conspicuous. The different forms and functions of the “normal” conceal normative aspects of what is good and just. Concepts of normality are subject to historical, academic and social developments. Normatively, they may be anticipated, solidified or rejected. Moreover, concepts of normality are often controversial and turn out to provide necessary, yet ambivalent orientation for thought and action.
There are numerous examples of controversial notions of normality, particularly in medicine and the life sciences. For example, when differentiating between health and illness, reference is often made explicitly or – on closer inspection – implicitly to normality. What body weight is normal for whom and where do the areas of “pathological” overweight or underweight begin? Up to what point can sadness be considered normal and beyond what point is one inclined to regard a sad person as depressed? Is there such a thing as genetic normality and what does this mean for our understanding of disability?
If normality cannot simply be determined statistically, the question arises as to who has the power and who has the authority to decide on its boundaries. Sometimes concepts of normality change gradually and imperceptibly, in other cases their overthrow is the declared aim of political campaigns. In liberal and pluralistic societies, tolerance towards deviations from “normal” behaviour and lifestyles can contribute to harmonious coexistence, but once again the limits of such tolerance are subject to negotiation. If, for example, deviations from the norm jeopardise the well-being of other people, various sanctions are applied, including coercive measures and other forms of exercising public authority.